We had this battle out a few months ago!
TL;DR, Points:
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The only mission uniquely fulfilled by the A-10 is Sandy (coordinating and protecting combat search and rescue), but part of the reason for that is only A-10 crews train for Sandy missions.
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Despite #1, the A-10’s visual situational awareness and famous 30mm let it perform ground attacks close to friendlies with lower odds of fratricide.
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Despite #2, the moment you introduce modern air defenses into the arena the A-10’s chances of surviving a fight plummet. While not currently an issue with the enemies we’re fighting, future proliferation of air defenses is a scary possibility.
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Despite #1 & #3, the A-10’s operating costs and reliability are still quite low compared to a F-15E or F-16C for counter insurgency (COIN) operations.
Possible Solutions and Why They Turn Into a Mess:
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Scrap the A-10, Give the F-15E Awesome Targeting and Upgrade the Datalinks!
Problem: Money. Unproven capability, time to develop TTPs and cross-train -
Preserve the Existing A-10’s, Then Build New Modernized Ones, The Design Already Works!
Problem: Extent/distribution of US military manpower. Skewed Military Focus on COIN. Nightmarish acquisition process. -
You’re stuck on 4th gen, Vive la F-35! Vive la 5th Gen!
Problem: Acquisition timeline, unproven capability, money. -
Design a modern replacement for the A-10
Problem: Distribution of resources (would it be worth it?), extent/distribution of US mil manpower, Skewed mil focus on COIN, acquisition timeline. -
Scrap the A-10, fill-in the gaps with UCAV’s, smart artillery munitions, upgraded attack helicopters, etc
Problem: Unproven capability, acquisition timeline, major shift in CONOPS/TTPs will cost lives during adaptation phase, money. -
Acquire a small fleet of dedicated COIN planes like Super Tucanos
Problem: Shift in CONOPS/TTPs could cost lives, military jurisdiction (are they USAF or Army?) causing cost/adoption timeline issues, distribution of resources, extent/distribution of US mil manpower, potential skewed mil focus on COIN.
The polarization the A-10 seems to generate doesn’t help the issue. On one extreme is the stereotype of a military industrial complex/ defense industry all too eager to help fulfill the desires of an Air Force that doesn’t care about the Army and just wants to fight its pretend air wars with technological marvels caught flat-footed when the boots on the ground need help fighting our real wars. On the other extreme is the stereotype of a bunch of Luddites that think CAS hasn’t evolved since 1945 or 1968 that like their flying tank who’re going to end up aghast when said tank gets schwacked without warning or mercy by a wild Flanker or Tunguska.