Not at all! We need to desensitize a bit when it comes to these things. How can we have a discussion about an event involving death without being morbid? Otherwise we just dance around facts.
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Yeah, the helo was probably filtered out from the TCAS, but I was unsure about the altitude as some reports state the impact happened just under 400â. Seems like they were operating just at the limit of the filter.
Yeah, and they couldnât have seen the helo coming, until maybe just before impact.
Iâm not saying otherwise. In fact, Iâm not blaming anybody. Just trying to get the picture.
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At this point, the best possible outcome is the flaw in the procedures is focused on and corrected.
If they say, âwell everyone did what they were supposed to do, just one of those rare things, canât do anything about itâ then their deaths will be in vain.
The latter happens all too often with tragedies in this country and Iâm sick of it.
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There is definitely (well in my opinion DEFINITELY) a problem with visual separation. Here in Newark we also have VFR helicopter routes around and over the airport. But helicopters are told to remaine clear of things (âRunway 4 thresholdâ, ârunway 29â, etc) not of traffic. Traffic separation is taken care of by visual traffic not âcoloring outside the linesâ. Had the helicopter been on Route 4, unless the airplane was extremely low, separation would have been guaranteed without the need for the helicopter to guess which of the million lights was the CRJ.
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The thing is that the potential for this accident has been present thousands of times before⊠What triggered the accident this time around?
Has something changed recently? It will be interesting to read what the NTSB concludes with.
For you guys who are rotor rated, how common is it for you to cross an approach path?
@chipwich Iâm helicopter rated but my experience in Class B-to-surface* flying amounts to just 4 flights, one was directly over EWR, one just 2 miles off JFK low the other about 4 miles off LGA. So take me with a grain of salt (as I am sure you do 
)
but the answer is NEVER.
The time over EWR was in an Agusta and our route was west to east directly over the center of the 2 main runways at 1000â. We were only on tower freq in case of an airliner going around. Otherwise, follow the VFR route exactly and at the specified altitude. For JFK we were 100 yards off the south shore of LI just a mile from the airport boundary but way under any arrival or departure path. With LGA we were talking to LGA and doing what they told usâthey NEVER asked us to remain clear of a specific airplane.
So basically, helicopters are given lots of autonomy in the US. But the ask is that they follow the VFR routes and altitudes to the âTâ. Doing so, they usually donât even need to be on the frequency. This is why it is against the law to descend below class B on an IFR flight plan. Because there is often uncontrolled VFR traffic below.
Now in the case of this accident, the Blackhawk did something odd. He flew south of Route 4 making a b-line for rwy 18 before turning easterly. He was never cleared to cross any approach path at a conflicting altitude. Had he been on Route 4 he would have been well below the approach path. Scratch that. I think it was a flightaware anomaly.
*ie, innermost ring of class b
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A short video combining the radar scope, DCA Tower comms and post-collision emergency vehicle comms.
This accident is eerily similar to the very recent NEAR collision at Phoenix Sky Harbor a few weeks back between Delta and United. The approach controller apparently forgot about Delta on base leg (became distracted with another inbound aircraft) resulting in an estimated 500-700â separation from United landing on a parallel runway.
In this case, TCAS literally saved hundreds of lives (not including potential ground collateral).
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Just heard a report that is saying no survivors. Horrific to think about. My heart goes out to the families.
Same in Charlotte. Nearly every airfield crossing Iâve seen by our medical helicopters happens directly over midfield after coordination with the tower.
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An update from Juan Browne who breaks down the D.C. helicopter routes, possible NVG restrictions, and PAT25 picking up the wrong aircraft.
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This is horrible.
Man, Iâve seen these situations before. Fortunately few and far between, and more fortunately it always âworked outâ.
But given these things:
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The ATC transmissions I heard didnât include a proper traffic call. It may have happened before though, ââŠdo you have the RJ in sight?â isnât enough.
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A Safety Alert was not given. I doubt theyâve changed that procedure; itâs never an option until the pilot tells you theyâre doing something about it - even if they say they âseeâ the traffic and/or performing a visual approach; Iâve had to do it. Yeah, at first you might feel itâs pointless (he said he saw it) but, you do it and move on. On radar watching 2 targets merge at the same altitude (or nearly so) gets your attention no matter what transpired before.
I still remember 2 T-38âs performing last ditch maneuvers 45+ years ago; our radios went down (long story) but the radar was still turning. Felt helpless.
That last bit is not, or was not, specified way back when but was the logical answer when a trainee would ask it. There is the understanding that you may not have time to react; update rates, proximity, closure rate, etc. I donât recall the exact wording of that section in âthe bookâ.
- Seems like the UH-60 was above the correct altitude; if it started up suddenly then there may not have been time to catch this.
And this part, well, always brings up (and Iâll bet this is going to happen behind closed doors) staffing, time on position, and allowable traffic loads. They are related. Been debated for a long, long time. Interestingly, to me, most of the close calls on the ATC side seemed to happen when you werenât really all that taxed, not so much when you were really busy. Up to a point. What that point is depends on many things.
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They may have different fundamentals there but doesnât seem likely.
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The visual environment for the UH-60 was likely confusing; nighttime plus cultural lighting (a lot of it Iâd guess).
âŠthere will likely be some changes.
Merging Target Procedures might be one thatâs extended and clarified.
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Good God! Thatâs heartbreaking.
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Semantics, but I believe 200â was correct. In fact the chart states â200â north of the Wilson Bridgeâ. The problem was position. The helicopter route is along the eastern shore of the river while the accident helicopter was over the middle. Reportedly, they were using NVGs if that means anything.
NYTimes reports that the practice at the tower is to switch to a single controller after 2130, by which time things slow down. The supervisor allowed the 2nd controller to leave well before that time leaving a lone controller to work a very busy period.
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The last time I used mil-spec was nearly 20 years ago, but my experience with NVGs (even binocular NVGs) is that your depth perception basically âgoes out the windowâ and it is very difficult to judge distance.
I know latest gen are much more resistant to âbloomingâ, but IMHO using NVGs in that environment, with all the street lights, car headlamps, aircraft strobes, etc is nuts.
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Been there. 99 times out of a 100 thereâs nothing wrong with it. Theyâre not going to pay for those 99 times. Itâs a bit deeper than that though.
Most controllers feel they can, and should be able to, âdeal with itâ. Thereâs a bit of ego that creeps in here too.
The supervisor should have been monitoring. No idea if this was so. And controllers, typically, HATE, to have someone looking over their shoulder. A culture thing, but you can solve itâŠ
I did it constantly cos I didnât want any of them to get into a bad spot : someone would walk by and see me looking at a display of everything - 50-100 aircraft - and give me some stick over it.
I even got some guff about this, at first, from my âpeopleâ. Eventually they realized I was doing it to help not âharassâ. After a few, âhey Joe Speed-bird 123 missed your turnâŠâ, âYeah boss, I got it, thanksâ, with nothing else ever said, they understood I was on their side.
I only vent this cos historically many (and I mean this) supervisors were there to punch a ticket - or avoid having to work airplanes. I heard back after I left that they âmissed meâ. Nice to be missed but I was tired of it. Going to court, or being part of that process, over washing someone out a few times andâŠenough. There needs to be a balance.
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Limited FOV? Just a WAG on my part.
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That was a good post with a great insight into the mindset of the controller. I know I could never be a controller in any capacity. I think you have to have a special mindset to do it and be good at it. As @smokinhole mentionedâŠthe audiotapes in the immediate aftermath show cool and professional conduct. Yes, the delivery is a bit quicker pace with adrenalineâŠbut I canât imagine what is going through his mind in that moment. The flood of that awful feeling of âdid I do that? did I contribute to that?â must be overwhelming to push past in the moment.
Obviously this accident will be studied to an incredible degree. There will be simulations or real life flights that will show what the helicopter and CRJ pilots were seeing that night. It does look like on the radar tape that the helicopter drifts upwards and is not in the proper position over the shorelineâŠbut it also does seem incredible to me that they regularly allowed helicopters to fly just a few hundred feet under relatively large jets. Even though a âdirtyâ jet doesnât put out as much wake turbulenceâŠI do wonder how many wake turbulence encounters helicopters encountered over the years.
Keeping situational awareness while instructing (if that was what was happening in the helicopter) can be difficult. Confirmation bias (I have that traffic in sightâŠyeahâŠthat is definitely him) is another one that is a human factor (not really pilot errorâŠjust humans being humans) that we often see. Iâve done it dozens of timesâŠif not hundreds.
My heart breaks for those passengers and crew of both aircraft involved. Such a tragedy. I canât even imagine the sense of loss.
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