There is no way any kind of a .50 will be an equivalent to a 30mm cannon, especially not the GAU-8. However, a .50 is far more cost effective for shooting up a technical than a 30mm and doesn’t jolt the airplane apart, either. You can also bring .50s in closer to troops in contact compared to a 30mm.
I would argue that a single GBU is actually more cost effective than the GAU-8 simply on the basis that the GAU-8 has a certain level of maintenance and care behind it vs. a GBU. The cost of a thousand cartridges of 30mm vs. a single bomb is a bit misleading as we forget that a gatling gun is a pretty complex weapon. The GAU-8 is by no means as simple as an NS-30, for example. I don’t know what the 30x173mm cartridges cost, but I’d bet it’s currently in the realm of $30-40 for the good stuff. That means you get a cost of about $3000-4000 per 100 round burst. So for about 500 rounds, you’ve reached the cost of a GBU-12, not including maintenance and upkeep on the gun.
An excellent area weapon system and definitely the preferred weapon if you’re shooting up APCs and the like. But you have to hope they aren’t going to be shooting back with much more than a few rifle caliber machine guns, and if we use something like a BMP-3 as an example, they bring 30mm cannons to bear as well - not including MANPADS and other regiment-grade SAMs. Bottom line, slinging bombs or missiles greatly increases your survivability when you don’t have the full details of what’s on the ground. With troops in contact, you’re better served by a lighter weapon that can stay on target better and offer more precision.
Most active protection systems fielded on tanks currently or in the near term aren’t that good at catching a piece of iron filled with explosive approaching them directly from the top, especially since a bomb is going to be going almost as fast as a typical large bore cannon shell. They’d also need some serious power to destroy or deflect the cast iron casing typical of the munitions. Against a missile, their chances are much greater, but even then most of them try to deceive the guidance system rather than stop the missile - it’s much easier and your chances of success much greater.
No prospective replacements are going to offer much over the A-10 besides decreased maintenance costs and potentially increased loiter times. The A-10 is a unique system and to get that capability in a new aircraft would require a development track a la F-35. What we’re trying to do here is covering the gap left behind if/when the A-10 goes away, and most of that is in COIN and FAC operations. An A-29 will never be as effective as an A-10 in raw killing power; it wasn’t designed to be. However, it can make an excellent platform to vector in friendly strikes, point out targets, and assist troops in contact. It can do that all at a price point far more palatable than an A-10 doing it, as painful as it is to say that.
Again, it’s all about what risks you’re willing to take. If the USAF didn’t feel it was a risk worth taking, we’d have an A-10 replacement by now. That is where the real issue lies; the Army and most of the people on the ground desire what the A-10 brings to the table, while the USAF feels it isn’t worth keeping over the latest pointy-nose fighters. It’s a disconnect from USAF culture with USA culture, where the USAF believes that it can win wars with air power alone while the USA believes that boots on the ground with air support is the only way to win a war. Neither is absolutely right because no two wars are the same. Sometimes air power alone can achieve political aims while other times the only way is to deploy ground forces.
As for the F-35 being used in CAS, the USAF believes they won’t be using it like the A-10. Instead, it will be flying at 30,000ft slinging PGMs, far away and above hostile ground fire. It’s not so much the golden BB as it is they’re assuming that they won’t ever need to take that risk. This, unfortunately, is not CAS. It would be foolhardy to risk an asset like the F-35 to make a gun run where the fellow with the PKM has an opportunity to riddle it with cheap bullets. That’s where an aircraft like the A-29 would come in… If USAF culture wasn’t so vehemently against such an aircraft.
Most of the A-10 damage/losses were due to MANPADS in ODS, with a pair having been hit by SA-13s. In OEF and OIF, the damage shifted to small arms and machine gun fire, with a Roland missile being responsible for a single loss in OIF.
At the end of the day, you’re faced with a dwindling budget, old airframes in dire need of replacement, and a series of mission types, all of which demand some kind of compromise. A simple, cheap, COTS solution like the A-29 is about the only way to do it within the framework that the USAF has set for itself.