…but LCS’s…
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The state of Chinese construction is rather abysmal and while I have no doubt they’re learning, my suspicion is that they’re more likely to face domestic issues before their fleet is a real threat.
Admittedly, I’m talking out of my two butt cheeks, and you know what comes out of those. Is there any good sources for what the chicoms are currently or projected to field when it comes to ships? Everything I’ve read has been in relation to their subs.
There are two sides. There is what the Chinese want to build, and there is what the Chinese are likely to actually field.
The former is quite formidable and worrying, the latter…well that gets in the realm of classified intel.
Great observations and insights!
Now you have me really thinking.
True-ish. In the USN we usually give escorts a sector-essentially two relative bearings and two ranges (inner and outer) from the guide (normally the HVUj. The ships are free to roam around that sector. So, yes, at any one time the formation is not completely symmetrical (unless they are taking a formation photo). However, the distribution of sectors may be symmetrical…or not.
How the Russians do it now? In Soviet days they had a lot, less capable ships that they could scatter about their HVUs. Nowadays?
Again, true-ish. If you have two CGs, one will be the “shotgun” staying only a couple of Nm from the carrier, stationed between it and the threat. The other may be sent a few Nm more down the “threat axis”, a more defined bearing to the threat-an enemy airfield, coastal defense missiles or more often and importantly, the direction of the enemy SAG. The CG are under the Air Warfare Commander (AW), usually the CO of the shotgun.
Only one CG? It’s the shotgun.
The DDGs (at least one) will be under the control or the Sea Warfare Commander, the DESRON Commodore (AZ; on board the carrier). They will normally be doing ASW work, but will have a secondary air defense responsibility.
The current threat / threat level, will determine where the DDGs operate. If the SAG is determined to be a greater threat than subs, their sectors may be moved to honor that threat, but the will still be at least screening for subs and/or pull one off for AAW (AW control). If subs are deemed the greater threat, the DDGs wil stay under AZ control and he/she will have greater freedom of movement to prosecute subs.
All that said, there will be SOP as to when the DDGs switch from ASW to AAW (control shifts from AZ to AW).
I suspect that since DCS doesn’t do subs, this is a moot point. So your point in the sim is spot on.
Less rarely than you may think if the N2 and his SUPPLOT team are doing their job (mine did. others…not so much).
However, you are spot on. No matter ho good the intel is, the Sea Control Warfare commander would be nuts (professionally negligent) if he/she didn’t hedge their bets as you describe.
In the spirit is worth a thousand words…a DCS mission is probably worth more.
Over this weekend I will build a War at Sea (WAS) mission in DCS, Caucasus Theater. It will pit a USN Carrier Strike Group (CSG) with a Russian Surface Action Group (SAG) centered on Slava CG Moskva.
We will assume that a NATO/Russia war has broken out somewhere in Europe - (which has prompted Turkey (a NATO member) to forego enforcing the Montreal Convention and allow the CSG into the Black Sea.
The CSG is running east along the Turkish coast to establish a Carrier Operations Area (CVOA) in the southeast corner of the Black Sea (thus giving it land on two sides that can be protected by TAF and USAF elements (currently deploying to the theater).
The SAG has conducted an emergency sortie from its hope ports in the Crimea and is steaming to intercept the CSG.
RADM Jack “Gambler” Rogers is the CSG commander. In his professional opinion, the SAG will be in SS-N-12 range before his CSG can establish a secure CVOA. Therefore, he had ordered a WAS strike against the Moskva SAG.
His intention/ the “Commander’s Intention” (the lynch pin of US planing doctrine) is to affect a Mission Kill on the CG–namely to take out the ability for the cruiser to use its SS-N-12s at their maximum effect range.
The staff planning team has met and come up with the following two uses of Action (COAs; you aways must have more than on COA to present; two is OK, three is better). They have been briefed to the Admiral and his warfare commanders in the Flag War Room.
COA 1: Eliminate the SAG’s Over the Horizon Targeting (OTHT) by eliminating its embarked KA-27 Helix helicopters (which can fly forward and provide OTHT to the cruiser). This will limit the Moskva to radar line of sight shots–increasing the distance it must travel to get into range-which will take more time (and put its own units in the CSG surface weapons range) - potentially enough time for the CSG to establish its CVOA under land-based air umbrella. This would be accomplished by destroying the flight decks and hangars of the helicopter capable units with “light” precision munitions (AGM-65, GBU-12, Rockeye) . At the same time a fighter sweep would shoot dow any airborne helicopters. The strikes would come in at “wave top” level and in EMCON. Protection against air defense would be EA-6B ECM and self protection ECM (chaff, flares, jammers) HARM will not be employed.
Pros
- The least destructive / least escelating
- Uses minimal number of airwing assets
Cons - Likely high attrition rate
- Russians likely quickly to replace Helix or use land-based assets for OTHT
(intel assessment: Probably less that one day before OTHT to SAG restored)
COA 2: A large WAS strike from at least three axis using a majority of airwing assets. The strike will be immediately proceeded by heavy SEAD and will use mostly standoff weapons (AGM-88, AGM-84). Various Operational Deception (OPDEC) measures will be employed to increase the chance of achieve surprise.
Pros:
- Estimated to have a good chance of heavily damaging CG Moskva -Mission Kill and/or Mobility kill (either will have the desired effect and meet the Commander’s intent)
- Likely “collateral damage” to escorts will reduce Russian Black Sea threat.
Cons:
- A large escalation in the war (i.e. lots of dead Russian sailors)
- With most of the airwing committed, less fighters to defend the CSG against a simultaneous Russian air strike.
(intel has confirmed TU-22M Backfire weapons loading at Mozdok AB)
Note: A Con for both COAs is the difficulty of finding the SAG in a heavy electronic environment. Since it is the same for both, it is listed as an “Assumption”; for planning purposes, all assumptions are assumed to be true and most be planned for.
The planing team recommended COA 2.
The Commander has chosen COA 2. The planing team is sent off to…umm…plan of course…
Under “normal” war circumstance we (the planing team) would be required to present the (mostly) finished plan in about 6 to12 hours. In the real world , after months of doing this for exercises, one is fairly confident which COAs that the commander will pick. So some of your folks would already be at work on COA 2 and we would make the deadline…you always make the deadline (or you get fired).
However, in this case I am going to take the weekend because…well I have sailing team racing today and some things to do on Friday…plus I really need to work out DCS’s Mission trigger system a bit better.
Obviously there will be a lot of FA-18 C’s involved. It is my intention to write the flight brief for a Hornet driver and those of you with the DCS FA-18 can simply substitute yourself into one of the sections. Or you can just sit back and watch it play out.
And here is the kicker - like in the real world, except for testing some triggers, I will not run this mission myself until I promulgate it. You all will be the ultimate judges.
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If you want spectators, and can run it say, after 1400 on Sunday, let me know.
It’s really a pity that there isn’t better subsurface asset use in this game right now- this would be an EPIC scenario to run, since you know the Black Sea Fleet would deploy their Kilos in a picket screen to track everything the American CSG does. Plus, we’re really, really hurting with the lack of Arleigh Burke’s in game- the OHP just doesn’t have the same versatility and strengths, due to the lack of Aegis and VLS.
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I thought about that. I plan on the CSG honoring the KILO threat which will have ramifications for the screen. As far as US subs…some “plot element” can be used to explain their absence.
All to true. Plus I’m pretty sure the Flight I DDGs have a good tail - but since there is no ASW…moot point.
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@Hangar200 I would be more than happy to test it with you and the others. Depending on times of course. If you could use that #mudspike time thingy i can see if work has stopped beating me for the week and can join.
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WOW…sounds great…since I’ve had DCS for all of a month somebody is going to have to help me through how to set it up.
Hopefully this will be a test of tactics…that I will have worked out all the bugs. By bugs I mean stuff like when I tell a B-52 to bomb a bunch of tanks in a garrison formation (rows in the open), and it releases 1 bomb at a time… and continues to circle the site…dropping 1 bomb at a time…the B-52 had 18 x Mk-84…so that sent realism out the window…I will hopefully have stuff like that eliminated.
@near_blind to stage left. @near_blind to stage left.
I’m more than happy to fly a Hornet or Harrier in this over the weekend as well, provided it’s after Saturday evening EDT (busy weekend).
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This homeboy only has the Harrier, but you can call me the “Mad Bomber” because I’ve become very good with GBUs.
Actually I had meant the as a single player mission that folks could run at home - a kind of experiment to supplement the multi axis - single axis attack conversation. I thought that FA-18 owners could jump in as a wing man - just follow the AI flight lead.
However, seeing the interest in running this as a multi-player event, I agree that is a much better idea…but it is going to take more work.
To do this correctly I will make/publish a KISS wheel kneeboard card so participants can see/pick a spot to fill. I’ll also need to publish a somewhat detailed attack plan - push times, HARM launch times and pre-planned targets (no TOO shots here) so participants know how the strike is to be coordinated…whether that works out will be up to you…just the real world.
So a long way to say Sunday afternoon is likely way to short for this “event” …let me figure out the Mudspike Time thingy and set up a good date/time for most.
For this scenario, it will be FA-18s drivers only. If it isn’t a total fiasco, I expand to amphib ops scenarios for the Harrier drivers (and possibly Huey drivers) along with FA-18 drivers. I was the Ship’s Intelligence Officer on USS GUAM (LPH-9) so I know a thing or two about amphibious assaults and other ARG/MEU missions.
Thoughts?
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I thought that the F-18 didn’t have HARMs or SLAMs implemented yet?
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For ship and sub construction, actually, it is not. Their new units are quite sophisticated and they are producing many. More than that I cannot comment due to my previous security clearances. (One sometimes wishes they would invent that flash-thing they used in Men in Black to make folks forget stuff).
My bonafides in this area: Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (N2) for the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet (2009-2011). AKA COMPACFLT N2. My job was to run/coordinate the Navy’s Pacific Fleet intelligence “enterprise”…with a special “interest” on the PLAN and the DPRK navy. Fun but exhausting.
Oh…and only AI FA-18 can shoot Harpoon…well that’s not going to work…drat…so maybe I back up and run this as an observed event (which means I should be able to make a Sunday evening mission in time).
BTW, does anybody know if DSC Combined Arms lets you control ships? Or just land vehicles?
I suppose that was one advantage to being deaf; I didn’t hear much of anything that was said during classified VTCs.
Without getting into OPSEC stuff, I’d think that the PLAN would have a huge logistical challenge on their hands if they are producing a lot of boats. I’m sure they’ve got a lot of that figured out, but the deeper political challenges involved have me doubting whether or not they’ll be an actual threat. Still, on paper, I’m sure they’re credible and the news stories over the years regarding overt acts by their subs indicate a solid understanding and application of naval war theory. Once again, not my forte, unless one considers a lot of time sunk into Red Storm Rising when I was a kid.
Just reskin some Su-25Ts as if they were A-7s and boom, problem solved!
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Yes, they have.
At the UNCLAS level, the PRC/PLAN looks at the Pacific with the persecutive of three island chains. The first, closest chain starts at the Ruykyo islands and extend southwards past Taiwan, to about Vietnam. This has traditionally been their operations area and support has been simply returning to port.
The middle island chain is the Northern Marianas, Guam, Palau, to the Philippines. The third, farthest island chain starts around Papua New Guinea/Soloman Islands and stretches northward through the Marshall Islands and Midway.
Over the last decade or so, the PLAN has begun to operate progressively farther east with auxiliary units providing logistic support. When I was at PACFLT they were deploying surface ships (small SAGs) between the first and second Island Chain, not to mention sending a couple of combatants, (with support unit(s) ) to the Indian Ocean/Horn of Africa area–participation in the multi-national anti piracy ops…right along side USN units.
The PLAN has also participated in the 2014 and 2016 RMPAC exercises in the Hawaiian OPAREAS, but was “disinvited” this year due to their militarizing of islands in the Spratlys.
As for the PRC internal political challenges, I leave discussion of those issues to people more versed in that area, such as yourself. As a military intel officer, I have always been more focused on military capabilities and operations, with just enough insight into a country’s government, economy, politics to understand the “why” behind their military actions. I have no doubt that your comments in this arena are spot on and I will look at the PRC/PLAN with that in mind. Thanks!
Yeah sorry. Whatever the corporate equivalent of Stupid High School ■■■■ has erupted at work this week, and processing that has my attention all sorts of divided. @Hangar200 I like the concept, as you’ve figured out players don’t have any fun toys for the Hornet yet. If you have any questions about the mission editor, feel free to ask here or shoot me a PM and I’ll try to respond.
@Franze, Basically China doesn’t need or want to fight an offensive war outside of WESTPAC. The majority of Asia and US trade comes through the three island chains Hanger pointed out in his post. They need only shut that down while achieving whatever other military goals they want, (Taiwan, SCS Hegemony, Japan or Korean effery, etc.). To that effect they’ve built their naval capacity around Anti Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy. These are your long range OTH radars, your DF-21, Submarines, roving CVBGs and more long range high performance ASCMs than you can shake a stick at. All of our bases in the region are either dangerously close to mainland China (as in range of eighteen metric crap tons of SRBMs), or uncomfortably far away (complicating logistics).
If you’re looking for an interesting read with your morning coffee:
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG888.pdf
Their latest generation of surface combatants, the Luyang I and II, the Luhai, and Type 055 DDGs are on paper uncomfortably close in capability to our Arleigh Burke DDGs, indigenously designed, and increasingly less reliant upon foreign (Russian) technology transfer. They only have a few of each, but nothing is stopping them from building more. Nothing quite matches our Ticonderoga class CGs silo for silo, but we’re down to eleven of those, and they are about to sprint face first into a maintenance wall that no one has quite solved in the early part of the next decade.
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The bigger issue is that while, like Hanger pointed out, they could do that sort of thing, it’s not at all certain that they would.
The internal economic situation is not at all rock solid and able to weather drastic trade cutoffs. China’s economy is basically addicted to growth right now. They grow at 6% annually or else, and that doesn’t happen without massive exports. They have gotten as far as they did by modifying the Communist playbook to allow for something far more capitalist than what the USSR tried and spectacularly failed to do.
Sure, China could cripple WestPac trade routes, either directly or merely by threats making it so risky everyone sits in port and waits. The issue however is that it will hurt them more than it would hurt most others.
They are not stupid, and there is no way the missteps of Japan leading to WWII would not weigh on their minds. They might be blind to their own shortcomings and mistakes, but they know the US isn’t the type to let transgressions go unanswered. Japan blundered in thinking that post-Pearl Harbor the US would just accept that Japan had asserted dominance in the WestPac and lick its wounds and stay home.
Then 50 years later Saddam bet that was all in the past and took Kuwait. Then 10 years later Al Qaeda and the Taliban thought they could get away with what they did. In every instance, the US struck back and crushed them.
Sure, there were some massive blunders that made it seem unwise in many respects, but that didn’t stop the US from doing it. We spent tons of money we didn’t have and lost countless lives we needn’t have but we did it anyway. The US has never been big on thinking through the long-term consequences of retaliations, it always does it and then tries to deal with the fallout later.
So on a political level this is more about gaining respect on the world stage by demonstrating that they can do these things as opposed to a desire to actually do them. After all, the US has had the power to nuke hundreds of cities, take out civilian shipping, shut down trade worldwide, and many other things for literally decades, but it never has. Not because we’re fundamentally angelic or anything, but because it would be counter to our interests to do so. There are numerous other countries with that power as well who also haven’t done it.
China wants Taiwan back, but it would vastly prefer them to come back in a political solution that makes them look good on the world stage. They want Taiwan to want to come back. It may be wildly unrealistic but that is still their preferred method. A military operation the likes of which they’ve never conducted before is bound to be messy, cause far more damage than is acceptable, and make them look bad to the world. It is their last resort.
Russia wants to be considered the superpower they were as the USSR again. I’m surprised Putin hasn’t commissioned “Make Russia Great Again” apparel because . China meanwhile wants to be in those ranks, but with more limited objectives. They want to be stronger than the US or Russia in the WestPac, but have no interest in the Atlantic. A local superpower, not a global one.
So…uh…class dismissed.
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Great insights…err…class. Will there be a test later? 
A couple of comments:
Agree 100%. I would add that the state of Taiwanese politics (when I stopped watching the problem in 2011) was making a peaceful return under some kind of “one country; two systems” problematic at best. The PRC isn’t helping matters with some of their enforced changes on Hong Kong, seen as breaking the one country; two systems promise…the Taiwanese are paying attention. Still I agree that Beijing will do much to make a peaceful return happen eventually…they definitely play the long game.
However, more to the point of your quote. They are preparing modern amphibious forces, naval forces and air forces (PLAF and PLANAF) not to mention other things, and exercising every year to do just that.
The old adage “Hope for the best but prepare for the worst” seems to be their current strategy in this area.
Let’s not forget Global Warming…with the receding northern polar icecap, soon the South East passage may be commercially viable. China has sent research ships up north to do some research. Why?
Currently the commercial sea transit to European markets for China goes south, through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, up the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal (with a hefty transit fee) and into the Mediterranean. If the cargo is bound for a southern European Country-Greece, Italy, France, Spain. They have a bit more of a trip. If bound for a northern European country like Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden or Poland, it means transit across the Med, up through the English Channel and potentially through the the Danish Straits (Kattegat and Skagerrak) into the Baltic. I once did the math…it is a long way. However, it the North East passage is open, (north through the Bering Sea/Bering Strait, across the northern literal of Russia, into the Barents Sea, and down through the Norwegian Sea) cuts the time/distance drastically. I also think it is much shorter to the US East Coast.
Yep…and how more massive could those exports be if they took half the time to get to their destinations? The PRC has already figured that out. Is that why they are helping Global Warming with their huge carbon footprint? I’m not that much of a conspiracy theorist…but still…
Good old Secretary of State Seward may not have seen it when he bought Alaska, but it gives the US a seat at the table discussing polar issues. China does’t have a seat. Keep tuned…this could get interesting.
…and some folks say Global Warming is a bad thing.