MacNamara sure made a mess of things in the DOD, that’s for sure. Sadly, the DOD was really asking for it at the time, because things like boots and working uniforms shouldn’t be different between the services. Not to mention the M14 boondoggle, which never should have ended up on his desk to begin with.
McNamara was the longest serving SecDef in US history. He brought cost-saving measures to the DoD, which, to be fair, was sorely needed.
He then turned around and completely micromanaged the aviation war in Vietnam to the point where it was costing lives for little to no gain. Both of these talents (cost control and management) he learned at Ford and thought they could work in combat.
The only person I’ve ever known who truly understood the economics of war and defense was Shimon Peres. The guy built the most capable military in the Middle East using whatever cast-offs the European continent would sell them. He got bang for the buck.
It has been my experience that efforts to make the military–any military–truly “efficient” is simply wrongheaded.
Good militaries are effective; they are not efficient.
When you are in the business of breaking things and killing people in large, industrial quantities, it is helpful to remember that the other side is engaged in the same business.
Thus you want a good degree of redundancy–inefficiency–built in because, the other side is going to break some of your stuff and kill some of your people. A truly efficient military lacks the “depth” to take significant loses…perhaps even insignificant loses.
I have watched, through my 28 years of service, as ship’s crews have been reduced and reduced in th name of “efficiency”. Where we once had three sailors who could perform any of three jobs, we now have one sailor that can do all three by himself. Before when the missile hit and one of those sailors was KIA, the remaining two could cover his job. Now when that one sailor is KIA, there is nobody to do any of the jobs. Multiply that over a ship’s crew…and that ship becomes hors de combat rather quickly.
War is the most wasteful of mankind’s endeavors in terms of lives and riches. It is unfortunate truth that to skim on people and equipment in the name efficiency, you will most likely loose both. I can live with effectiveness at the cost of (some) efficiency, if it keeps me and my shipmates alive and in the fight.
Many nations try to build effectiveness through ever advancing technology–Quality vice Quantity. It is an effort to gain efficiency and effectiveness. It works to a point. However, at some other point Quantity has its own Quality.
Which brings us back to the title issue. More slightly less capable F-16s instead of less but more capable F-15C? Hmmmmm…maybe it does make sense.
Gas in the Air…its all about Gas in the Air.
Can someone speak to the F-35’s range as it relates to the F-18 or F-16? Longer? Shorter? Comparable?
It seems to me that gas bags would be counter-productive to a stealth airframe…
Assuming an all internal loadout: much longer. I don’t know if the F-35 has been cleared for external stores yet, but that can be extended further.
It would be interesting to see stealth-tech designed external bags.
I believe the more economical option is to just use the normal kind and punch them off before entering the zone of danger.
FTFY
That’s a pretty cool revelation to me actually. I honestly never really thought of it that way - great post!
I believe that that is not very viable, something to do with trapping the signal instead of dispersing it but I have only the most rudimentary understanding of how that is executed so perhaps it is.
HIGHWAY TOOO THE TRUCULENCE ZONE!
Really… it writes itself…
The problem with punching out external stores is the point of separation tends not to be stealthy anymore. Holes, pylons, ridges, whatever.
The situation as I understand it is stealthy planes carry external ordnance (including fuel) only when they are in low-threat areas where the stealth compromise is less important than the mission requiring those stores. So obviously transfer flights can have them, but beyond that it’s something the local commanders determine.
While some progress has been made on the post-jettison stealth front, it’s still risky and requires pylon jettison as well as the stores, and those are not designed for that.
So, while an F-16 or Hornet isn’t noticeably less stealthy with external tanks, they tend to always carry them, extending their base range. An F-22 or F-35 does get compromised, so they don’t usually carry them into combat.
Therefore, I believe a clean F-35 does not have the same range as its tank-laden predecessors, but is greater than they are clean. My guess is tanker support would paradoxically need to be closer to the front line with stealth aircraft than with legacy planes.
http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a23522/lockheed-blended-wing-body-tanker/
Looks like Lockheed is already on the case in terms of low-observable airlifting.
The RCS of an F-16C roughly doubles with fuel tanks attached. I don’t know about the F/A-18s, but I’d imagine it’s analogous.
From what aspect?
Forward.
Right, so given the F-35s much smaller RCS, I’d imagine the difference is probably an order of magnitude or greater.
Great article (slightly OT) about Atlantic Trident 2017…
The TL;DR - "Some may ask, “What is it like to fly adversary against the most lethal integrated fighter force on the planet?” My answer, “You just die. Sight unseen. You just die.”
Longer.
That’s kinda the basic idea behind CFTs. Extra gas with little to no RCS increase or performance decrease. Check out the Advanced Super Hornet or later block F-16s.
17.8k for a single seat Rhino with a single centerline compared to almost 20 in a slick F-35C with only one motor.