There is a passage in the article where a former Boeing instructor talks about training in Asia. And a couple of times he mentions a part in the syllabus where runaway stab trim was addressed. Elsewhere in the article Langewiesche states that every Boeing pilot is keenly aware of the cutouts. The implication from the article was that among experience (read: Western) pilots, the cutouts would have been the obvious first response. This simply is not true. Not once in my training was a runaway stab trim event ever taught. The only time the switch was ever once discussed in my presence was during initial training in June of '98*. I was once questioned by a Line Check Airman as to why I checked the switches during preflight. At the time, it was not a procedure at my airline. I just did it because the switches were there and it seemed beneficial to check them. Otherwise they collected dust and would never get tested except by maintenance. I guess what I am trying to say is that the article implies this culture of knowledge and awareness that simply did not exist (at my airline anyway) prior to November 2018.
*It might seem odd that something so important wasn’t given much emphasis. But keep in mind that the only way that the high speed trim motor can be engaged is by pilot actuation. And the yoke itself has its own cutout when the pilot applies pressure counter to the direction of the trim. The autopilot, Speed Trim, and Mach Trim systems all use the slow motor and it would take ages before any of those systems could trim enough to be a problem. Of course, the Max changed all that. But no pilot outside of Boeing could have known of this until the truth came out in December.
Well, if we’re simplifying the airline industry into a ’Management’ and ’Operator’ side, you will notice a difference.
Managment leaning towards winning market shares by cutting cost and selling cheaper tickets.
Operators leaning towards staying safe, no matter the cost.
It’s not as simple as this. It’s hyperbole. Bear with me.
Management is actually starting to consider safety as a constant. It’s never been safer to fly. They are not only asking themselves if it’s necessary to continue to pour money into additional safety measures. They are starting to ask themselves how much cost can be cut, from safety measures, without reducing the over all safety, measurably…
Now, anyone from Management will say that they would never jeopardize safety. Safety comes first, always. Period.
If you ask them about it, they will also say that training operators cost a lot of money and that they are constantly searching for the right amount of training, making sure they don’t train their operators too much…
Training, is a costly safety measure.
Management wants to buy aircraft that doesn’t require retraining.
And the aircraft producers comply.
This was just a simple way of showing that Boeing isn’t the only culprit here. In a way you could say that they are just meeting the demand of their customers.
Absolutely, and this point the FAA should step in and say “But not like this”. The aircraft is being made by the cheapest bidder, but for now even they have to adhere to aviation standards, ergo a minimum cost is incurred in aircraft parts and structures. The FAA is supposed to sit there and stop that slipping and sliding backwards.
Sure… But even government agencies have their ’Management’. The FAA has got to cut cost as well.
Can they hire the same engineers as Boeing or Airbus? Do they have the funds to maintain that kind of know-how? Don’t know about the US, but over here they don’t.
Exactly, the business management approach has infected everything, the whole ‘when all you have is a hammer…’ phrase comes to mind. And frankly us taxpayers should pay that price if we wish to ensure safety, at the end of the day we too have a responsibility to vote for the politicians that campaign for this(if any at all). Though that latter approach is not very realistic I admit.
And to add another layer. Personally, I’d rather pay $100 or $200 more dollars per ticket to ensure that airlines remain profitable, can invest in technology, can invest in training, and that can be passed on to manufacturers through aircraft orders for more of the same. Of course, there is no telling where profits will be reinvested (or not at all if you are paying dividends to share holders) and perhaps the model works on cheap tickets and volume rather than expensive tickets and less volume. In a perfect world, you could retain high passenger loads while also charging a fare that would meet the needs of the airline industry from top to bottom (manufacturing, training, salaries, etc…).
It has been an interesting decade or so where airlines have had pretty impressive profitability. When the economy takes a downturn, that is when you’ll really see the trimming across the board and our period of a very good safety record may reflect that.
Yeah but the problem is that the airlines won’t do that. It is the primary problem with business today: when you become a mature business, it is all (and I maybe all) about profit and minimizing cost. It takes someone new to come in a upset the balance - and even then the older mature businesses struggle to change. Example: SpaceX. We would need to change the mentality of the business class away from a profit driven (and therefore shareholder driven) focus and that is not going to happen in our current culture where profit is queen and king.
As the electrical utility industry across the country is taking a long, hard look at the long-term economic and policy-related consequences of deregulation, both from those who have deregulated and those who are considering it, I can’t help but wonder if there’s been any in-depth analysis on how these sorts of things affected American airlines as a result of deregulation. Anybody have any thoughts on that?
Part of the problem has been the FAA designating Boeing and Airbus employees to do their oversight for them due to the magnitude of the job and the lack of FAA funding.
It’s a clear conflict of interest, but there was literally no other way of doing it unless they wanted to take years longer to certify.
The FAA still made the call to go with that instead of just saying “tough luck, we’ll get to your case in about 2 years, tada!”. At this point the manufacturer ought to go to the politicians and say “hey, the regulatory agency is underfunded and understaffed, get some more people in there”. What both parties did what in this situation is the worst option possible. It blurs the lines between regulator and manufacturer, oversight and execution.
And it got us two crashes and the grounding of a massive fleet plus a lot of reputation damage to the FAA that will take years to restore.
The aircraft manufacturers don’t want to pay for the extra employees and the public would never agree to the new taxes necessary to fund it. We just want to complain about it when the process breaks down, and then still do nothing about it that is going to cost us more money per ticket.
So @smokinhole - this question for you since you probably have a better feel for the temperature of the pilots flying the 737 Max (understanding that you are not on that equipment though)…do you think this plane has a chance to come back? I see today that the American Airlines FA Union has thrown their hat into the ring as far as wanting to be part of the decision-making on whether they will agree to fly on it. Is there a training solution that would allay the fears you think? Or combination hardware/software/training? How are the pilots feeling about it?