No, that’s true.
It’s just that culturally, there’s a big difference in accountability.
Some cultures lean more on the commander. Something happened. Sack the commander. Problem fixed.
We’re used to shared accountability, that goes all the way to the top of the company sometimes.
Which is why my boss, and my boss’ boss, etc. really want to know about any problems I have when I go about my daily business. That way they can share the accountability and help me fix what’s wrong.
I like it that way 
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It ain’t so. The AFDS sets the command bars for V2+(something, usually 15 on Boeings or lift-off plus 15). Laterally it is runway track. What may have confused the system would be an immediate engagement of the autopilot during rotation and the system alt-capped…I guess(?). But who on earth would do that?
Anyway, Emirates has had a bunch of these near disasters that miraculously weren’t. It’s luck not skill. I believe part of their problem is in how they micro-manage crews. The word “may” occurs hundreds of times in my company’s FM and FOM. The words “shall” and “must” occur too, of course, but only when clearly required in my opinion. US and (presumably) European carriers require crews to be proficient in hand-flying and flight with flight directors and Autothrust off. We teach it in the sim but also require it on the line when conditions allow.
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Yeah… Must have been more to it, right?
Another thing about most Boeings is when the altitude window is zero at the gate and the FDs are turned on, the FMS indicate “Alt hold”. To me, it’s a feature-not-a-bug sort of thing. The FMAs are basically screaming, “You still have work to do to get this plane ready to fly!”. So to @troll’s point, the warnings are there in spades. But stupid is stupid no matter how much information you feed it.
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A couple of curious things on reading around this (speculation on speculation I guess)
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The 777 300ER is the smallest (!) aircraft Emirates fly, so it’s usually the most junior pilots or new hires.
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There was four pilots in the cockpit, as it was a backup crew flight.
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Due to COVID a lot of these pilots were furloughed and are now only recently back, so training / tiredness etc could be a factor.
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Overspeed at that height and that flap setting was cause to return, but they pushed on.
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Commenters on other boards noted EK management as terrible, to the extent that they want to ‘cut down’ on go arounds by asking for formal reports each time, which now leads to less of them. Sounds awful and puts me off on flying with them.
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They’ll be a FAA report as the destination was the US.
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Well said. Indeed, our EU company actively trains the basic skills in every recurrent program. Full manual raw data flight and approaches.
Especially with more MPL trained cadets finding their way to the company its very important to keep this in training.
Unlike the classic way of being taught to fly from a Cessna 150 gradually to the airliners, MPL courses have a focus on sim based training much more.
As a result we start seeing people who are VERY proficient with the automation and programming of the various management systems of the jet, but their ‘common sense’, ‘stick and rudder’ skills and ‘airmanship’ often still needs further developing.
Not to say the old ways delivered pilots fully ready, but flying solo from the middle of Holland all the way to Barcelona with 6 students and 3 small aircraft exposes you to all kinds of experiences that develops your airmanship at an early stage in your career.
It also makes your training a hell of a lot more expensive, so I can see where the push towards having to spend less money comes from, but at the same time I am a tad worried how this relates to overall competency and safety over time.
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Agreed! We can add all kinds of things to the no-takeoff warning system- is the flight plan in the FMC? Heading and altitude set? How about a squawk code in transponders? Etc, etc…
…or we could teach airmanship, CRM & procedures, and train proficiency.
And maybe even do the one really hard thing:
Cull out those who shouldn’t be there because they fail to meet the standards.
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Yep! That’s part of the reason I took on the new responsibilities within my company.
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It seems my point was completely lost by most. I see this happening a lot. I need to express myself better in 2022 
I never meant that there should be a loud alarm associated with the programming of the FMC/FD/AP or anything like that. What I tried to say was that if just setting the altitude to zero would casue a delayed rotation, pitch down and overspeed, on takeoff, there would be an alarm. There isn’t, so I don’t think that the answer is as simple as missing one item in the departure brief…
Nor do I think anyone who gets hired by Emirates and passes the typerating on the 777 is stupid or shouldn’t be a pilot.
Again, I think the answer to what happened on this flight is more complex than that.
The crew probably made one or more mistakes. That is almost a given.
But, the fact that they made a mistake isn’t as interesting as why.
The thing is, if one crew can make this mistake, could others…? If so, there may be a systematic problem here. Perhaps more so, than an individual problem.
The report will be interesting to read.
Questions for those who fly such modern crates.
The overspeed. They continued the flight. Doesn’t the 777 relay limit exceedances back to engineering?
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Don’t think “777”. Think “airplane”. That’s all it is. Setting “0” in the MCP Altitude window no more limits, inhibits, prevents or discourages rotation than does sqwawking “2001” in a 172. The crew rolled down the runway and simply did not to rotate until they hit the overrun. In no airliner, but especially in no Boeings, do you reference the Flight Director on rotation. You rotate to a reference pitch angle and once there, the FD will catch up and give good guidance. And that’s the point where a miss-set altitude window might start messing with your guidance. But first you gotta rotate! For whatever reason they chose not to. And I am certain that decision did not come from an abundance of intellect.
But let’s say Eric is making harsh judgements without being fully informed. Fair enough. More information may well provide some needed perspective and maybe sympathy. But I am as certain as the sun will rise tomorrow that this will be seen from even the most sympathetic pilots as a titanic crew breakdown.
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And that reason is what I think makes this so interesting.
This is probably closer to the answer than a simple aircraft system input error.
Oh, and yeah. That’s what I’m saying. Or at least trying to say.
It can’t explain the incident.
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One of the FOs on my crew today is displaced off the 777. He’s as baffled as you or me. But it’s not the plane. At least not in a physical sense that the FBW or trim system somehow inhibited rotation. We know this with absolute certainty because the crew opted to continue on their 12 hour flight. Of course they also oversped the tires and the flaps and still opted to continue. So there’s that.
I think I know what you are trying to say, @Troll. I get it. In your world you are surrounded by airmen who value and thrive on active, collaborative decision-making and solid flying skills. I hope you don’t think I am talking down to you when I say that the culture (company, not national) in which you exist might blind you to the shocking incompetence that thrives outside your bubble.
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Yes, and this prompted my question above. Doesn’t the 777 automatically send exceedances like these in? Wouldn’t they have been instructed to return?
Yes. The 777 tells the company thousands of things real-time. And Boeing probably has guidance on what excedences are problems and which are not. The company may have decided with solid reasoning that the safest option was to continue. I guess we’ll learn some of these details a year or two from now.
Also edited my post above to “troll” you a little. Just having a little fun. HNY!
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Well that’s an interesting take. I’ll translate it as a cynical remark. Lol!
The jet sends back stuff to the company for sure, but I would be very surprised if that data is monitored in real time at the office.
At our company we have a safety department where flight data gets analyzed 5 days a week, but they get their data in batches.
A computer then runs its magic and if red flags are found an officer needs to manually assess the data.
If there is reason for an interview the case will be escalated.
Of course the situation is different in case of an incident where the aircraft stopped its flight. Then there is action right away.
The fact that this crew flew onward makes it all kinds of interesting. Was there any comms with ATC about the incident? Did ATC inform the company if there was? Did the crew?
We just do not know.
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I remember a story I heard 22 years ago from a friend who flew 777s for Continental. Coming eastbound from Tokyo they received an ACARS message from Maintenance Control asking if they were noticing any odd behavior on one of the engines (GE). They were not. GE didn’t like what they were seeing nor did the maintenance people in Houston. After explaining the possible severity of the issue to the Captain and dispatcher it was agreed to divert to nearby Anchorage. I don’t recall what happened after that. But even way back then, the plane gave real-time data beck to both the company and other parties who have skin in the game.
I wasn’t being cynical. Exceedences happen all the time. All require a maintenance signoff eventually. But not all justify a diversion. The flap exceedance I think would be less of a concern than the 205 knot tire speed limit. But those too get exceeded when heavy, hot and high combined with too slow a rotation. Usually crews are totally unaware that their groundspeed was so high at liftoff. But anyway, these are considerations that happen a dozen times a day at a typical large airline. There was nothing typical about this particular day. I imagine that airplane sat in Newark for at least an extra day getting a full workover before being released to return to Dubai.
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I seriously doubt we’re any better than any other group of pilots. We have a lot of pilots with international experience from all over the planet.
But I do agree that our company culture is different than many others.
Exactly. The exceedances may have been within go-limits for all we know. Returning would mean dumping fuel or overweight landing.
The thing is,
It is possible that much of what happened here has nothing to do with incompentence but instead falls within the realm of reasonable human error. If this is the case, it is probably something I could’ve done too and should make an effort to learn from.
Or, if it is a case of gross negligence or incompetence, the company should review its hiring standards.
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At any rate, thanks for the discussion chaps! Its nice to have a place where we can have discussions with respect for eachother, rather than the usual ‘if you do not agree you are against me’ typical internet BS!
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So here’s one. It happened at my airline so long ago that I can talk about it. In the 90s we had a crew land a DC-9 gear up and flaps up in Houston. No injuries. Nothing whatsoever wrong with the plane. Captain and FO could be heard on the tape laughing at one another’s Daffy Duck impressions as the GPWS warnings screamed at them through touchdown.
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Out of curiosity, were they both outliers in the company? Did they fail training, lack performance or otherwise distinguish themselves, prior to this event?