I wonder what the story behind the story is on this one - sounds like not even a basic pre-flight was followed?
Children of magenta.
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A bit more detail in this one. All four pilots have been fired, according to the report.
I would have assumed that setting the climb altitude would be a checklist item? Sort of like calculating your V speeds Iâd assume.
It might not be on every operatorâs checklist (for instance, itâs explicitly not on ours which is based on the manufacturerâs checklist for the airframe we fly), but itâs absolutely part of everyoneâs SOPs.
Our checklist just spells out âCrew Briefingâ, the last item on the Before Takeoff checklist before âline-up itemsâ like strobes and hot items, but our SOP expands that into what items need to be covered and set, and altitude selector on the MCP is definitely one of the important ones.
That said, if after takeoff the command bars/flight director arenât giving me a climb, Iâm going to ignore them and set a climb pitch attitude. This problem happened long before takeoff, and is a lot deeper than failing to set an altitude in the MCPâŠ
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Is the flight clearance pre-cleared on these sorts of flights (via ATSU or whatever the Boeing calls it), so the initial altitude is in the FMS already?
In the simple world of sims Iâm so used to calling ATC and getting a clearance (CRAFT etc) that always includes what I would check is on the MCP alt - in fact I put the MCP altitude to 9995 when at cold start, just to show me that I havenât got cleared yet.
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I assume they were using PDC/CPDLC, but really have no idea how they received the clearance for that flight. Either way, while some fancy cockpits can automatically input the clearance into the FMC/FMS, nothing can change the altitude selector on the MCP automagically (to my knowledge), the initial altitude (or top altitude of the SID) has to be manually selected (which is a good thing! Letâs keep it that way, lol). Maybe one of the heavy-metal drivers can give their input and correct me if Iâm wrong about that on Boeing/Airbus equipment.
Youâre doing it right; we just leave it at 0 until we have something to put in, then verify both after receiving the clearance, and during the takeoff briefing that what we see is what we got.
I do one more check that is probably not much more useful than crossing my fingers, but I always read back âXXXX, up to 5000â, cleared for takeoff runway XXâ, whether the tower controller gave me the altitude right then or not. My hope is that if weâve somehow misunderstood/selected the wrong altitude, the tower will catch it right then as weâre taking the runway and prevent me having the file a NASA report for an altitude bust. I donât know if it helps because Iâve never had that happen (could tomorrow), but I figure it canât hurt.
Iâve never flown anything as advanced as the 777, so I know very little about its systems and the SOP they use.
From reading about this incident I am left with the impression that unless an altitude higher than zero is set, the aircraft wonât climb on the departureâŠ?
Please say it ainât so.
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The aircraft should do whatever the PF is telling it to do with his control inputs, up until the AP is engaged. The issue here appears to be a loose nut behind the yoke blindly following the FD, I think.
I speculate, based on the two or three articles Iâve read (written by other people, who are also speculating), that something like the following happened:
MCP set to 0â,
+TO/GA pressed prior to T/O,
+Current altitude within 200â of selected, FD mode automatically switches to ALT CAPture,
=FD gives a neutral or negative pitch value on the PFD.
Maybe this creates a moment (or two) of confusion, which is why the aircraft stayed on the runway for so long prior to rotation, which the PF then accomplishes without reference to the suicidal FD.
After takeoff, the autopilot is engaged at approximately 200â (which seems low to me, but I like to hand-fly to at least 1000â, airlines do it differently and thatâs okay). We donât know if they got their FD mode fixed or not, but I doubt it because of what happened next.
If the current altitude is still within 200â of the selected altitude on the MCP, the FD would probably re-enter (or have remained in) an altitude capture mode. In their case, climbing, I would expect the AP to gradually level the aircraft, then enter a steady but gentle descent to capture at a couple hundred FPM. Which appears to be what it did, with the flight crew watching a wondering âWhatâs it doing now?â until it got as low as 175â MSL at 260+ knots. 
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If the 777 is any similar to our 737 its a limitation to not engage the autopilot prior 400 AGL on takeoff. FCOM chapter Limitations.
Not setting the MCP is, imo, a sign of bad prep from the crew and whats more astonishing is that it wasnât catched by any during the whole pre departure process.
Even if it isnt a item on the checkist, which I doubt: our before start checklist has an âMCPâ item which forces us to check the altitude window and I assume Boeing sports some commonality between types; it still is a vital element in setting up the autopilot system and should be covered in the PFâs departure briefing.
I , for example, always set the altitude limit of the SID plus or minus 100 feet in the window until we have confirmed the clearance and reset it to the proper alt.
There is no one single correct way. The point is that many pilots have their own mannerisms to do things according to operating procedures while implementing little tricks to enable being challenged or corrected. This constitutes good CRM and aids flightsafety.
Another thing that strikes me as odd in the article is that it claims the Flight Director system would point the aircraft toward the 0 altitude.
This would only happen if they ALSO did not engage the TO/GA button on takeoff roll to engage the autothrottle. That would be odd.
So a lot of questionmarks here.
While I am always quite sceptical about the stuff journalists write about aviation incidents (and these linked pages also have a lot of speculation which I dislike very much) its quite clear that in this case there are some objectively incapable people involved.
âFlying Upside Downâ anyone?
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Now Thatâs some really terrifying reading. Iâd forgotten about that one, what a mess! And itâs nearly ten years old now, what are things like now? 
Yeah, but if not setting the correct altitude causes all these problems, shouldnât it be incorporated in a takeoff config warning, or something?
And while I can, to some degree, see why the flying pilot followed the flight director, who was monitoring the flightpath?
As you say, a lot of speculation in those articles⊠We definitely donât have the entire picture here.
What was that?
I havenât flown in such an environment myself, but stories from our instructors from recent missions are still the same as theyâve always been.
In certain countries culture remains such that flight safety is far less important than hierarchy, status, cash and all other detrimental factors.
There are still operators flying into your and my homebase who have absolutely no business coming into our airspace from a safety point of view.
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The takeoff config warning warns for unsafe aircraft conditions. Not brainless pilot conditions.
Flying Upside Down is a book and essential reading imo!
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Yes, but if forgetting to set the altitude is just as dangerous as forgetting to set flapsâŠwell⊠See my point? It just donât make sense. Why would the rotation have been delayed because of wrong altitude setting?
Never heard of it.
This one?
A brief synopsis, please?
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Well, thatâs the thing. Not setting an altitude in the MCP by itself is not necessarily a dangerous thing. Youâre connecting dots that are very specific for this case where
- we donât have all the info
- the issue is not directly related to not setting the MCP rather than a failure of many other things (the âholes in the swiss cheese lining upâ - kinda way
if you press down your accelerator pedal to the floor while parked at a busy lot after having put your gear in drive, you will wreak havoc. Yet your car doesnât prevent you from doing it.
If you close a scissors while your finger is between the blades⊠and so on.
An aircraft is a complex machine and there are infinite ways you can make it into a hazardous machine. Thatâs why crew needs to be trained and operating instructions need to be followed.
Back to your question; not setting the flaps is more dangerous because it hampers the aircraft to properly fly (in time).
Not setting the altitude window doesnât disallow manual flight. The aircraft is perfectly able to fly and perfectly controllable. And every pilot should have the reflex to start manually flying the aircraft if it doesnât do the things you expect it to do. Fly the aircraft, assure safe parameters and then analyse whatâs wrong and follow up. Again, training and competence.
Besides, I still have the impression the whole âMCP altitude window not setâ probably isnât the root cause of the incident here at all.
Assuming the did press TO/GA on takeoff to engage the autothrottle, this will also place the flight director into TO/GA mode, causing a safe pitch up guidance.
So, for the PF to have blindly steered after the FD after takeoff, like the article suggests, there has to be other stuff taken place thatâs out of the realm of normal procedures.
Furthermore, I donât think turning the AP on after takeoff with the MCP altitude window set to 0 feet will make it pitch down at all. (but I might be incorrect). If it actually was the pilot flying just blindly following the flight director with total disregard to other indications then we come back to me statement above; training and competence.
Before ending up in endless speculation we should wait on reliable info.
On to the book, yep thatâs the one.
Its a âwitness reportâ if you will, from a pilot who has flown in China and chronicled his adventures. He touched upon culture differences, company policy, training, inter personal customs, influence of politics, etc.
Its annecdotal and so some things probably should be taken with a grain of salt (which he puts into a disclaimer at the front of the book as well) and he uses a lot of strong language in the book, which might turn some people off, but all in all its a very interesting read if you can stand the style its written in.
Even if only half of it is true, I run long enough in the world of aviation that I can assure you the general gist of it, certainly is not made up.
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Exactly. That was the point.
It canât be the root cause here. Just missing a checklist or flow item canât explain this flight.
Dismissing this as pilot error is way too easy. There must be some compounding causes.
I see. Iâve never worked there myself, but I know enough friends and colleagues that has.
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Weâll find out when more reliable reports will come in. But I agree that itâs usually not as easy as âthe guy did or didnât do this or thatâ.
Besides, the PF wasnât alone in the cockpit.
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Hopefully not⊠
And, about culture. I heard the FC of Emirates 407 speak about his experience with the tailstrike at Melbourne. I also talked to a Norwegian ATC controller that worked over there. He had a go-bag packed at work, ready to leave on the first plane out, if the situation would require it. I could never work under such conditions.
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Yeah, I have spoken with several ex colleagues who tried to pursue their luck in the middle east or asia as well.
Most returned back to some place in europe aftera fairly short stint after realising thereâs more to life than just a fat paycheck.
But to be fair, you donât have to look that far east to see the cracks unfortunatelyâŠ
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