I think that might be it. Nice find!
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There’s a similar mention in Sharkey’s book.
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Lately, I’ve been having better luck with the Sparrow, but as it turns out, not because I completly understood its function. This is the best short tutorial that I have found on how AIM-7s work in both BVR and ACM modes. That pinky weapons selector switch may not be doing what you think it does.
For me, it was a case of not RTFMing thoroughly enough. It’s all here if you need to see it in print.
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The Phantom is probably the only module so far where I prefer video tutorials over written manuals. The HB manual can be quite vague with things.
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Exactly! I HATE videos. But words only work when the words make sense. This guy did what I was unable to do: translate the HB manual into something close to English.
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And RIP to the very outspoken and Falklands SHAR legend Nigel “Sharkey” Ward who passed away this year.
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The Sparrow was developed to shoot down bombers, not fighters. While the 7M was pretty good at it, these earlier ones are not. It was all work arounds and tricks to get them to be effective.
The thing about Vietnam was the North was the one that needed the interceptors, but theirs were only what the USSR would give them which were basically fighters. Those PVO interceptors never were sent south.
Meanwhile the US didn’t need interceptors (as the North wasn’t a bomber threat) as much as escorts and CAP but had all these interceptors pressed into the role.
That either side had much success at all is testament to luck and tactics as the equipment was not designed for the tasks they used them in.
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Correct.
The MiG-21bis did not enter production until '72 and the VPAF received its first examples in '77. The Soviets had a lot of confidence in this ultimate iteration of the Fishbed after the extreme dislike toward the MiG-21SMT and assumed it was the best light fighter in the world. But, they proceeded to get a reality check when they got their hands on a former-RVNAF F-5E as it was able to best the MiG-21bis in several mock engagements. They proceeded to absolutely fill their drawers when their newer MiG-23 was met with similar results as the MiG-21.
I’d have enjoyed witnessing their reaction when they first observed soft-wing F-4s at airshows, or worse, the F-16.
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I love the music they used to play in those training films.
It’s like the world’s most deadly episode of Leave it to Beaver!
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Now THAT cracked me up. So true.
Beaver was an after-school staple; first iteration of using the “insert type of device here” to keep the kids occupied while mom cooks dinner (when we weren’t playing football, USA version, in our yards).
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“…very fast and maneuverable. Stable at all speeds.”
Well, one of those is an accurate statement looks at sore trimming thumb.
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Can someone explain (perhaps you @MiG21bisFishbedL) why the F-5 didn’t get utilized more in Vietnam by the US? The F-4 and F-105 were huge and complicated. The F-5 seems like a better fit for light CAS, nepalm and other “closework” where range and loiter are not so important. My image of the war is the US flying big, expensive stuff while RVN flies (no offense) outdated slugs like Sky Raiders and Tweety Birds but no one really flew planes from the middle.
Before giving them to the VNAF the F-5C was tested and trialled by the US under Skoshi Tiger in SEA and was supposedly evaluated against some of the other US platforms. The payload and range was just too poor for SEA especially when you consider what the F-4 could haul up there. Same goes for the F-104C you needed a lot of bombs to hit the target. The F-4 could also threaten with the Sparrow which may have been total cr*p but it was an all aspect threat that couldn’t be totally ignored.
The SEA performance of F-5 / F-104 was directly what put a lot of the USAF off the LWF program in the 70s as they demonstrated themselves as only fit for export. High technology changed that significantly but the LWF winners would still go into service as bigger multi role jets.
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Cool. Thanks. Meant “F-4” in my “huge and complicated” line above. (Corrected)
No doubt the Vietnam era AIM-7 is much maligned. But Ritchie and DeBellevue certainly understood and made good use of them. On at least two of their kills, they ripple-fired two Sparrows.
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Cool. I read several accounts that the Sparrow had a low Pk (around 10 to 15%, depending on the source). As a result, crews adapted by ripple firing at least two. Apparently, multiple factors impacted the effectiveness of the missile such as unrealistic testing, poor aircrew training and understanding, enemy maneuvering and countermeasures, and maintenance.
A poster on Quora recommended reading ‘Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965-1972’ by Marshall Michell III to understand the issues crews faced when using Sparrows.
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To contribute to @MigBuster good reply, the F-5 series had a number of bugbears that stayed with it that would ensure it’d never see service as a US frontline fighter. But, those same issues would also ensure it was a resounding export success. The TL;DR of this folly of a post is that air forces have different needs in a combat aircraft.
Your view of the war with the US flying the most advanced aircraft of the era along with the RVNAF flying much more outdated platforms is largely correct. This was a problem that the Kennedy administration had taken note of, as well. The Military Assistance Program existed to ensure that NATO and other allies who didn’t care all that much for the beliefs espoused by the Soviets had ample arms to resist aggression from the USSR or her allies. But, the view you have of super advanced American fighters and outdated hand-me-downs given to her allies was an issue.
They were getting F-100s, Skyraiders, and a number of other such obsolete kit. An ally with near useless equipment is not of great value in a war. This is why the N-156 became the F-5 and then became a genuine success. The F-5’s secret was really is price tag as it balanced with the aircraft’s own sophistication.
The F-5A wasn’t an outdated platform, it had supremely good handling, and could provide the air to air sting of the relatively new AIM-9 Sidewinder. On top of all of that? It was small and that size meant it was easy to maintain on the ground, easy to store, and was cheap. It became the star of the MAP, with the US providing these affordable little fighters to allies free of charge in some cases. The additional bonus of the F-5B trainers being very much combat capable themselves further added value.
It was a great weapon to shore up an ally to fulfill an auxiliary combat role, but not as the backbone of a main force.
Along with previously mentioned payload issues and short legs, the F-5s didn’t crack Mach 2 until someone at Northrop put an F404 into it and it became the Tigershark. At the time, you couldn’t show up to the USAF with something that couldn’t crack Mach 2 and this wasn’t a view exclusive to the USAF, as well.
I mentioned, earlier, that the MiG-21SMT was a disappointment. The major reason why was because, when compared to other MiG-21s, it seemed to have dieted entirely on carbs like a lot of us did in 2020:
It was mostly owed to how big the saddle tank had become to increase its range. As a result, it wasn’t anywhere near as nimble as previous iterations and the subsequent successor in the MiG-21bis, but more egregiously? This is a MiG-21, something that was noted for being blindingly quick, that could only hit Mach 1.7. What SMTs were acquired either received smaller saddle tanks or were relegated to ground attack.
It wasn’t a dealbreaker as the type served for 2 decades in the VVS, but we have a hard time imagining this thing performing any air superiority role. Overall, the even the MiG-21s had began to shift from their popularized role as dedicated interceptors as we always perceive them doing into tactical fighters in the same way the Phantom did.
Lessons learned over multiple theatres, especially the Indian usage, revealed the growing need for a more flexible aircraft and that specialization can hamstring an air force should it suffer minimal losses, provided they’re the right losses.
The difference arrives when we start talking the most basic doctrinal differences between a Western and Eastern bloc air force. The MiG-21 fulfilled its role quite well within the confines of the old Soviet ideas of frontal aviation and was a good fit for nations that were either small in terms of land mass or with concentrated population centers. In this role, the F-5 would also perform beautifully. I’d argue better than any MiG-21 of the Cold War era owing to is superior radar, better weapons, and especially smaller size which really helps with upkeep, hiding it, etc.
It’s why we saw the F-5 really succeed in places like Switzerland where it fit the bill for their defensive doctrine almost perfectly, outside of MAP’s purview. Nations that could afford better found the F-5 was good enough for their needs. We also saw it do well in places like Spain, Norway, and the Netherlands since so much of NATO’s attention was focused on the defense of Europe. The F-5’s short legs weren’t an issue in on a continent of tightly packed allies. Its payload being small was augmented by multiple flights. If you look at F-5 operators of the past, they all seem like customers who’d be naturally drawn to the modern day Gripen, with few exceptions. But, the F-5 did fit a similar niche as the Gripen: A small, but very sophisticated aircraft for its era that both enjoys reasonable operational costs and a smaller ground footprint to enable better dispersal.
The first exception was Mexico, of which the US kinda screwed over. They wanted Kfirs, but the US didn’t want Mexico having J79 powered fighters for some reason. So, they got F-5s.
The second exception is Canada, who forward deployed the F-5 in Europe. This does reveal a shortcoming the USAF would have very much considered a dealbreaker that is the F-5’s value within its more expeditionary doctrine. The US, over the last 100 years, has displayed a willingness towards the idea of interventionist policies. While it’s a topic for discussion, needless to say this attitude toward that policy has shaped the USAF’s needs.
As an expeditionary weapon, you need a lot of time aloft to cover great distances. Especially, if you’re coming from North America to Europe. What good is the blood, sweat, and aviator lives spent by the US Navy to establish an initial air corridor to fly in through if you have to make multiple hops that drag out the time they have to hold it themselves or even be shipped in aboard naval assets, making one wonder what the USAF is even doing?
And that’s just getting there. Now, the F-5’s small payload makes an ugly appearance. In a situation where the balloon went up, the F-5s would facing an enemy wholly different from what they faced over Vietnam. While Hanoi was an air defense corridor even more densely defended and vicious than Moscow itself, the F-5 was relegated mostly to strike and CAS taskings as requested by the ARVN and some US Army assets.
Now, the F-5 would face a real shooting war and it’d have to contend with armored formations unlike anything seen in the jungles of Southeast Asia. This is because the F-5 would have been, despite having clear value as an air to air fighter, utilized as a close air support platform. The small payload would have meant a lot of F-5s in the air to make up for that. This, actually, wouldn’t be a problem for the airframes as the Skoshi Tiger program did indicate that the F-5 was wonderfully reliable and durable. However, this also means that relatively small air arms would flying at a greater tempo and pilot fatigue would set in faster in these smaller units than in the larger, better equipped ones.
Canadian planners assessed their own CF-116s as to having several concerns when employed in such a high threat environment.
And now, it’s slow speed enters the equation, although I DO have to point out that the Canadian CF-116s are F-5As and Bs, which are even slower than the F-5Es (Mach 1.2 vs Mach 1.6). Their findings indicated that the slower F-5 was fairly vulnerable to MANPADs and other such mobile SAMs that the Soviets would have forward deployed. They also lacked the more sophisticated ECM equipment that a larger fighter, like the F-4, could carry. After all, on the F-5, if it needed to (provided it could) carry an ECM pod? The choice is between payload or fuel. On the F-4, it’s one less Sparrow. This also meant, later on, that the F-5 was not too capable of deploying more advanced PGMs on its own outside of the few wired to use Mavericks. Basically, time caught up with the F-5 by end of the 1970s in a big way.
So, while the USAF did see and like some of the virtues the F-5 displayed, its short range, small payload, and slow speed coupled with the strategic demands of the USAF made it a non-starter. This became very clear after the USAF got its hands on a MiG-21F-13 in Have Doughnut. Here’s another light fighter, but it’s a lot faster and had impressive characteristics in the air. While the MiG-21 didn’t dazzle the USAF crews over Vietnam, despite the popular notion, it very much did over the deserts of the Southwest. It made it clear to the US that a capable lightweight fighter was possible and probably served at least as an example of a success to those running the LWF Program.
Despite the F-5’s low price, the F-4 was a better value simply because of the performance and results it could produce. Even in its twilight years of the 1980s, the F-4 was a spectacular strike platform owing to its excellent handling, power, and its capability to use a variety of precision weapons. On top of that, the 1980s vintage F-4s were more than a match for anything the Soviets could deployed, short of the MiG-29. F-5s were a more competitive match up against MiG-21s and MiG-23s, which is something no air force is interested in. Not very sporting, but that’s war.
In summary, we have had this notion that advanced aircraft bring more shortcomings than they are worth mostly owing to very shallow opinions formed in the wake of the USAF’s own failings being made apparent by its initial performance over Vietnam. Shortcomings in training for both air and ground crew as well as their extremely shortsighted insistence that TAC existed to protect SAC bombers and nothing more were blamed on the technology as opposed to institutional failings. We don’t see the same dismal performance from the US Navy, from the same era. We don’t see stellar performance until later, but the US Navy more often than not outperformed the USAF.
This view evolved into the assertion that the US didn’t do well over Vietnam because its fighters didn’t have guns when, in fact, only the F-4 lacked a gun. I have to mention this, because I’m sure to have a bunch of 70 year old Crusader jockeys hunt me down and throw bricks at my house should I fail to do so.
Because, Crusader pilots were nuts.
Also, it’s obscene how many gun kills Thunderchiefs tallied. Something like 25 MiG-17s.
Anyways, fast forward to the wake of 1991 and we have our old friend Pierre Sprey and the Fighter Mafia claiming the A-10 was the most successful platform of the conflict, when the F-111 actually busted significantly more armored vehicles and the A-10 did use sophisticated weaponry like the Maverick more so than its vaunted gun.
This idea that simple and cheap will always beat “complicated and expensive” every time is something that does appeal to taxpayers, after all.
Of course, this same idiot petitioned the Pentagon to deploy uparmored and upgraded M48 Pattons instead of M1A1 Abrams to the Persian Gulf. You know, against T-72s and an army with 10 years of fighting experience in their immediate past against Iran.
An army we helped and equipped and advised.
Few seem to recall that little flub by him.
So, I’d ask this: It’s February of 1991. You’re asked to deliver a load of hurt into downtown Baghdad. You’ve been given a rare opportunity to select from a variety of aircraft. Would you take an F-5E or an F-16? Would you take an F-104 or an F-117?
What has been maligned as complicated is sophistication. It’s the RWRs that let you know you’re being looked at, it’s the jamming suites that can thwart a SAM, it’s the stealth technology that lets you go unseen, it’s the laser guidance that allows you to pop a GBU through a window from greater distance than it would be possible to hit that building with dumb bombs alone.
The reason the USAF didn’t embrace the F-5, despite its clear positives, is because that it recognized that tech does save lives, serves as an effective force multiplier, and cutting costs will impact overall performance beyond just survivability.
I’m not sure the F-5 would’ve been able to hack it over Hanoi given that, again, it was better protected that Moscow itself and while VPAF air crews weren’t spectacularly good, North Vietnamese GCI and AD clearly was.
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Agree- that was a wonderful reading!
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